Definindo a arena política local: sistemas partidários municipais na federação brasileira / Defining the local political arena: municipal party systems in the brazilian federation / Une définition de l'arène politique locale: systèmes de partis municipaux dans la fédération brésilienne

This article analyzes the Brazilian political system from the local perspective. Following Cox (1997), we review the problems with electoral coordination that emerge from a given institutional framework. Due to the characteristics of the Brazilian Federal system and its electoral rules, linkage between the three levels of government is not guaranteed a priori, but demands a coordinating effort by the parties' leadership. According to our hypothesis, the parties are capable of coordinating their election strategies at different levels in the party system. Regression models based on two-stage least squares (2SLS) and TOBIT, analyzing a panel of Brazilian municipalities with data from the 1994 and 2000 elections, show that the proportion of votes received by a party in a given election correlates closely with its previous votes in majoritarian elections. Despite institutional incentives, the Brazilian party system shows evidence that it is organized nationally to the extent that it links the competition for votes at the three levels of government (National, State, and Municipal).

Dans cet article, on examine le système politique du point de vue local. Selon l'exemple de Cox (1997), on considère les problèmes de coordination électorale qui surgissent à partir d'un cadre institutionnel donné. Compte tenu des caractéristiques de la fédération brésilienne et de ses règles électorales, l'articulation entre les trois sphères du gouvernement n'est pas assurée et demande un effort de coordination de la part des leaders des partis. On part de l'hypothèse que les partis sont capables de coordonner leurs stratégies électorales à divers niveaux du système. Les estimations des modèles de régression à deux stades (2SLS) et par TOBIT, prenant pour base un panel de municipalités brésiliennes comprenant les données des élections de 1994 et 2000, montrent que la proportion des votes reçus par un parti lors d'une élection est étroitement liée aux votes reçus précédemment aux élections majoritaires. Malgré les aides institutionnelles, le système brésilien de partis semble organisé nationalement dans la mesure où il articule la compétition électorale aux trois niveaux de gouvernement.

Negociando a reforma: a privatização de empresas públicas no Brasil / Negotiating reform: the privatization of public companies in Brazil

Brazil's experience in the privation of public companies belies explanations to the effect that the sucess of market-oriented economic reforms depends on the existence of an executive branch endowed with the autonomy to conceive and impose strategies of change opposed by vested interests. The article contends that privatization has moved forward in Brazil despite the clear absence of an autonomous executive, through a negotiated process of change that is part of an institutional context which multiplies both points of vetoand actors holding veto power. As a consequence, success depends upon the interplay of pro- and anti-privatization interests, whithin institutional constraints, as well as upon relevant actors' dominant ideas concerning the public sector's role and scope